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Abstract 
Autocratic governments make claims about why they are entitled to rule. Some autocracies 
are more talkative than others, but all regimes say something about why they deserve power. 
This article takes seriously these efforts by introducing and interrogating the concept of 
autocratic legitimation. After engaging in a definitional discussion, it traces the development 
of autocratic legitimation in modern political science by identifying major turning points, key 
concepts, and patterns of inquiry over time. Ultimately, this introductory article aims to not 
only argue that studying autocratic legitimation is important, but also to propose context, 
concepts, and distinctions for doing so productively.  To this end, the article proposes four 
mechanisms of autocratic legitimation that can facilitate comparative analysis: indoctrination, 
passivity, performance, and democratic-procedural. Finally, the essay briefly introduces the 
five original articles that comprise the remainder of this special issue on autocratic 
legitimation. The article identifies avenues for further research and identifies how each article 
in the issue advances down productive pathways of inquiry.    
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1. Introduction: How do autocracies legitimate their rule?  
 Can an autocratic regime be called legitimate? Does it make sense to use the concept 
of legitimacy to describe a feature of non-democratic rule? Under what conditions does the 
concept apply? What are the constituent elements of the concept? And, how do autocracies 
legitimate their rule more concretely? These questions guide the research articles in this 
special issue. The contributions are dedicated to studying the concept of legitimacy in an 
unlikely context. The overarching thesis of this special issue is that autocratic legitimation has 
causal influence on numerous outcomes of interest in authoritarian politics. These outcomes 
include regime resilience, challenger-state interactions, the procedures and operations of 
elections, and the texture of everyday life in autocracies.  
 This introductory essay aims to map the conceptual terrain on which the articles 
operate by outlining the foundations and major turning points of the study of legitimation in 
autocracies. In doing so it will not only argue that studying autocratic legitimation is 
important, but also will propose contexts, concepts, and distinctions for doing so. More 
specifically, it proposes four mechanisms of autocratic legitimation that can organize research 
in this area: indoctrination, passivity, performance, and democratic-procedural. These 
mechanisms capture the conceptual content of a variety of legitimation claims across different 
regime types.  
 At the outset it is necessary to establish that it is acceptable to talk about autocratic 
legitimacy and legitimation. Etymologically, legitimacy referred to a form of political rule 
that was justified by the absence of despotism and tyranny and was, instead, characterized by 
the rule of law (Würtenberger, 1982, pp. 680–81). From its inception the term legitimacy 
referred therefore to just and right rule. In common language, it still describes a form of rule 
that is seen in the eyes of the observer as fair and good. These normative connotations make it 
understandable that the term has been used mainly to describe democratic regime forms. 
Legitimacy provides a vision for how rule should look and this normative question is most 
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often linked to democratic polities. With the ostensible triumph of democracy after World 
War II and the renaissance of democratic ideals and institutions (Keane, 2009, p. 648), 
legitimate rule was often equated with democratic rule such that even non-democracies felt 
they had to make some pretense of being democratic (Dahl, 1971, p. 5).  
 The conceptual foundation provided by Max Weber is useful for constructing analysis 
on comparative authoritarianism. His main idea was to ‘emancipate’ the social sciences from 
the study of what should be to the study of what is, of what we actually observe (Weber, 
[1922] 1978). With such an empirical view on social phenomenon, it is possible to use the 
term legitimacy belief even in non-democratic contexts. And indeed, for Weber, the legal-
rational type of rule was only one of three types of legitimate rule. Charisma and tradition as 
the two other forms usually lack democratic foundations. On the contrary, the exceptionalism 
of a person or the rightfulness of tradition is not based on a democratic procedural 
understanding of legitimacy in which elections are the minimal core of the concept 
(Przeworski, 1999).  
 Systems theories in the social sciences also provide useful anchors for the current 
discussion on comparative authoritarianism. The distinction between ‘diffuse’ and ‘specific’ 
support (Easton, 1965) is open to all types of political systems, be they democratic or 
autocratic in nature. Systems theory also points to an important dimension, namely the effect 
of legitimacy – or the ‘support’ for legitimacy claims. Beetham has distilled three positive 
effects that legitimate rule brings about: enhanced order, stability, and effectiveness 
(Beetham, 1991, pp. 25–37). This holds true for both regime types. From an empirical 
standpoint all types of regimes, be they autocratic or democratic, need to justify their rule in 
order to maintain longevity (see Kailitz & Stockemer, 2015). No political regime can endure 
only on repression and co-optation. Legitimation is a third complementary ‘pillar’ that also 
sustains autocratic rule (Gerschewski, 2013). A leader can gain access to power by using 
repression, but in the long run, all types of political regimes need to legitimate their rule. Key 
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empirical questions thus become not whether but rather how, to what extent, and with what 
effects any given regime has been successful in procuring legitimacy (see also Beetham, 
1991).  
 Normatively, it is understandable that there are objections and reservations about the 
usage of the term legitimacy in non-democratic contexts. ‘Legitimate authoritarianism’ might 
open avenues for politicized and relativist statements of any sort that might even go so far to 
defend and excuse the normative foundation of autocratic rule. Empirically, it is indeed 
debatable as to whether voluntary consent is an integral part of the definition of legitimacy. 
Do people need to be capable to choose freely between alternatives and explicitly approve 
principles in order to view a regime as legitimate? If the answer is yes, then legitimacy is the 
wrong concept to use for autocratic settings, and perhaps even for entrenched democratic 
systems. Alternative concepts like political culture, loyalty, or support might be more fitting if 
such a view is endorsed. However, we propose to follow a Weberian perspective and ask how 
regimes legitimate their rule and what people believe (for whatever reason) about those 
claims. In so doing, we assume that the concepts of the legitimacy claim of the rulers and the 
legitimacy belief of the people are the proper concepts for understanding autocratic 
legitimation. In this sense legitimacy is something that autocracies attempt to acquire or 
cultivate through their legitimation claims, symbols, narratives, and/or procedures. Whether, 
how, and to what extent the legitimation efforts of a given autocracy results in legitimacy is 
an empirical question that can (and should) be researched by political scientists. The 
remainder of this essay traces the intellectual history of these concepts, proposes a 
categorization of autocratic legitimation mechanisms, identifies potentially fruitful lines of 
research inquiry and suggestions for approaching them, and briefly introduces the articles that 
comprise the rest of this special issue.  
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2. Distilling four legitimation mechanisms   
 A recurring question of comparative autocracy research is: how do non-democratic 
leaders gain followings among their people? In this section, we outline the career of 
‘autocratic legitimacy’ in modern political science and – based on the conceptual discussion – 
distill four different mechanisms on how autocracies legitimate their rule: indoctrination, 
performance, passivity, and democratic-procedural.
i
 From the 1940s to the 1960s, research on 
autocracies was dominated by the debate about totalitarianism. From this perspective, the 
ideological indoctrination of the people was the focus of scholarly debate. How could the 
Nazi regime in Germany, Stalinist Soviet Union, or Maoist China be so successful and why 
could they seemingly anchor their legitimacy so broadly in society? The research in the 1970s 
and 1980s then shifted its focus more on socio-economic conditions in (mostly) military 
regimes. Scholars emphasized the performance of autocratic regimes and how this 
performance induced quiescence in the population. Today’s research aims to understand how 
autocracies have sought new, much more subtle ways in securing their legitimacy vis-à-vis 
the ruled. By using elections and the image of responsiveness to the demands of the people 
they give themselves the pretense of a democratic-procedural legitimacy (see more detail in 
Gerschewski, 2014).  
 
2.1 Totalitarianism, the role of political ideologies, and the indoctrination mechanism 
 Major works during the first phase of modern research on autocratic regimes are the 
classic writings of eminent scholars like Hannah Arendt, Carl Joachim Friedrich, Zbigniew 
Brzezinski, and Raymond Aron. From different perspectives, they sought to understand the 
nature and the rise of totalitarianism. While they differ in their approaches, they converge on 
the importance of political ideologies in consolidating and sustaining non-democratic rule. 
Arendt formulated a socio-philosophical attempt to understand the emergence and the essence 
of totalitarian rule. She argued that ideology and terror are the two essential features of these 
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regimes (Arendt, [1951] 1966). For her, totalitarian ideologies have three distinct features. 
Firstly, they aim at ‘total explanation of the past, the total knowledge of the present, and the 
reliable prediction of the future’ (Arendt, [1951] 1966, p. 470). Secondly, in addition to the 
omnipotence of totalitarian ideologies they become independent from empirical reality. 
Totalitarian ideologies develop a utopian millenarian promise that immunizes itself from any 
type of anchoring in empirical reality. Thirdly, Arendt argues that totalitarian ideologies 
present themselves as logical entities. Based on axiomatic premises, all else, including the 
course of history, can be logically deduced. 
 From a different viewpoint, Friedrich and Brzezinski also placed ideology as among 
the most important characteristics of totalitarianism. They aimed at explaining the inner 
stability and working mechanisms of totalitarian regimes and in their famous six-point 
catalogue, ideology is omnipresent in political and daily life (Friedrich & Brzezinski, 1956). 
The indoctrination and propaganda machines along with the supporting organizational 
structures might have been unparalleled in totalitarian regimes. They aimed at creating a 
homo novus, a new man. This type of all-encompassing exposure to political ideologies is 
indeed a very rare phenomenon. The open research question is, even today, to what extent the 
German, the Soviet, or the Chinese population were true believers, passive followers, 
opportunists, or just ordinary people trying minimize catastrophe for themselves and their 
loved ones during the high tide of totalitarianism in those states (for historical work that 
addresses these themes in each case see, respectively, Browning, 1993; Fitzpatrick, 1999; 
Dikötter, 2016).  
 Today, only North Korea comes close to this totalitarian type (Scobell, 2005; 
Armstrong, 2005; Dukalskis & Hooker, 2011). It exemplifies what we call the ‘indoctrination’ 
mechanism insofar as the North Korean government goes to great lengths to ensure that its 
citizens believe its legitimation claims (see, e.g. Hassig & Oh, 2009, pp. 133-170). The state 
attempts to thoroughly control the media, school curricula, public visual space, and the private 
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time of citizens to create what a United Nations Commission of Inquiry called an “all-
encompassing indoctrination machine that takes root from childhood to propagate an official 
personality cult and to manufacture absolute obedience...effectively to the exclusion of any 
thought independent of official ideology and State propaganda” (United Nations, 2014, para. 
27).  
 Even so, North Korea has undergone significant social change since the mid-1990s 
that complicates its image as a totalitarian state (Armstrong, 2016; Choi, 2013; Lankov, 2013; 
Armstrong, 2011). Recent survey research shows that the North Korean people have become 
increasingly aware of how to critically evaluate their leadership (Haggard & Noland, 2011). 
Potentially oppositional spheres like shadow markets have emerged that can under some 
circumstances challenge totalitarian control (Dukalskis, 2016; Joo, 2014). There are still many 
unknowns in the case of North Korea and the thrust of recent research suggests that while the 
totalitarian model may have some analytic utility, the reality is more complex than some 
classic formulations suggest. However if one understands the totalitarian ideal in Mussolini’s 
sense of ‘everything within the state, nothing outside the state, and nothing against the state’ 
as a goal of the North Korean state and not an achieved reality, then the category is more 
straightforwardly applicable.  
 Even if this form of autocratic rule is extreme and relatively rare in today’s world, it 
marks one important pole in the spectrum. It shows that a political ideology imposed from 
above can influence the population with the aim to create a feeling of belonging among the 
ruled. Manichaeism, quasi-religious millenarian promises, revolutionary appeal, maybe even 
seemingly scientific accuracy, and interpretive autonomy can produce a behavioral following 
– and a cognitive legitimacy belief among the indoctrinated people. Given that autocratic 
regimes which emerge out of a revolutionary struggle and emphasize revolutionary 
totalitarian ideologies that are often reinforced by external enemy-at-the-gates and external 
scapegoat rhetoric tend to have long life-spans (Levitsky & Way, 2013), it is important to 
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retain this sort of ‘indoctrination’ mechanism in analysis of contemporary autocratic 
legitimation.  
 
2.2 Shifting to authoritarianism: performance and passivity mechanisms    
 However, most contemporary autocracies do not work like this any longer. The era of 
almost exclusive and comprehensive ideological mass indoctrination seems to be by and large 
gone. Ideocratic regimes that posit a utopian ideology still do exist, but have become rarer 
(Backes & Kailitz, 2016) .  But modern autocratic regimes still contain traces of these 
extremes so that it is helpful to keep in mind the historical experiences to understand the inner 
working mechanisms of contemporary regimes. The scope and force of indoctrination is 
limited and the legitimation methods and instruments appear to be much more subtle and are 
exercised with more finesse.  
 By the 1960s one could observe a tendency to shift attention away from the overly 
ideological regimes to a stronger emphasis on socio-economic conditions. This had much to 
do with the changing empirical reality in which totalitarian regimes became increasingly 
crowded out and replaced by what Linz termed in 1964 ‘authoritarian regimes’ (Linz, 1964). 
These regimes were non-totalitarian non-democracies and occupied subsequently the place in 
the middle between the poles of democracy and totalitarianism. When Linz took stock a 
decade later, he had established that authoritarian regimes are not characterized by ideological 
appeal, but are rather ruled by what he vaguely called ‘mentalities’ (Linz, 1975). Despite 
subsequent criticism of the term, the direction was clear. These regimes do not intend to 
mobilize the masses by referring to an ‘exclusive, autonomous, and more or less intellectually 
elaborate ideology’ (Linz, 1975, p. 191), but to more apolitical sentiments and apathy among 
the people. If totalitarian regimes sought to mobilize the entire population and shape the daily 
lives of their citizens, authoritarian regimes were more content to depoliticize the population 
and leave them alone provided they did not obstruct the regime’s goals.  
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 Many of these regimes were dominated by the military. Military regimes typically 
justified (and still do today) their need to intervene in domestic affairs in order to restore 
political order, revive the economy, and protect the nation (Nordlinger, 1977; Perlmutter, 
1977). This is a recurring frame across decades of military involvement in politics in different 
regions. The military’s right to rule is derived from being the guarantor of stability, order, and 
national interests. In his classic study, O’Donnell argues that for cases like Brazil after 1964 
and Argentina after 1966, the military not only took power, but also formed a coup coalition 
with the technocratic elite to seemingly fix the country and establish a ‘bureaucratic 
authoritarianism’. This coalition followed a managerial leadership style (O'Donnell, 1979). 
The South Korean regime of Park Chung Hee from 1961 to 1979 exemplified the combination 
of economic development to restore national glory, harsh repression of leftist and pro-labor 
forces that would challenge the regime’s project, and the promise of protection from both 
internal and external threats (Kim & Vogel, 2011).  
 Around the same time, the concept of the ‘rentier state’ gained prominence (Luciani, 
1987; Skocpol, 1982; Mahdavi, 1970). These autocratic states are not characterized by 
ideological indoctrination, but rather by satisfying the needs of the people and rendering them 
passive. By relying on rents, mostly from oil and other minerals, these regimes aimed to 
deliver prosperity in exchange for acquiescence. ‘Allocative co-optation’ remained a major 
explanation for the sustainability of autocratic rule in the Middle East and North African 
region (Albrecht & Schlumberger, 2004, pp. 382–83). Painting with a broad brush, the 
argument is that there exists a hidden social contract between the ruled and the ruler that as 
long as the regime delivers and provides public and private goods, there is no need for the 
ruled to protest and attempt to change the political situation (Ross, 2001).  
 What is important for the purposes of this essay is that both the focus of the legitimacy 
claim of the regime and the nature of the legitimacy belief of the people appeared to change 
after the high tides of communist and fascist totalitarianism. While totalitarianism was 
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characterized by ideological claims and by mobilizing people to turn them into ‘new men,’ 
subsequent authoritarian regimes claimed to be economically successful and aimed to foster 
passivity and political indifference among most of the population. In terms of the mechanisms 
discussed thus far, these types of regimes emphasized the mechanisms of ‘passivity’ and 
‘performance’ more so than the ‘indoctrination’ mechanism prevalent in totalitarian regimes.  
 
2.3 Modern autocracies and the democratic-procedural legitimation mechanism 
 In the 2000s research on non-democratic rule underwent a renaissance after two 
decades in which scholarship concentrated on explaining different trajectories of 
democratization. In a recent review Pepinsky (2014) argued that this resurgence in research 
on autocracies was characterized by an ‘institutionalist turn’. In this new wave of research, 
questions of legitimation were of secondary importance, if they featured at all. Scholarly 
reviews on the state of the art in general (Art, 2012; Brancati, 2014; Pepinsky, 2014), on 
military rule (Geddes, Frantz, and Wright, 2014), on one-party regimes (Magaloni & Kricheli, 
2010), and on the role of elections in authoritarian regimes (Gandhi & Lust-Okar, 2009) 
barely reference legitimation. The research has instead concentrated on explaining durability, 
persistence, and stability through a focus on the delicate balance between intra-elite cohesion 
on the one hand and the usage of coercive instruments and tactics on the other hand. 
Institutions like parties, parliaments, courts, and elections are discussed mainly insofar as they 
provide the autocratic regime with functioning avenues for co-optation and repression 
(Brownlee, 2007; Gandhi, 2008; Magaloni, 2008; Svolik, 2012).  
 The idea that autocratic regimes aim to create a following among the people or that 
they are able to legitimate their grip to power is rarely taken into account except with 
reference to co-optation or material interest. Only recently has some nascent scholarship 
begun to consider autocratic legitimation on its own terms (e.g. Kailitz, 2013; Kailitz & 
Stockemer, 2015). Case-based research has pioneered this new strand, most prominently for 
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the cases of China and Russia (e.g. Gill, 2015; Gill, 2011; Holbig, 2013; Su, 2011; Shue, 
2010), but also in cases as disparate as Kazakhstan (Schatz & Maltseva, 2012), Singapore 
(Morgenbesser, 2016b), and Cuba (Schedler & Hoffmann, 2016). Such research has yielded 
valuable insights into how autocracies aim to legitimate their rule.  
 Given its size, economic importance, longevity, attractiveness as a governance model, 
and tactical sophistication, China is first among equals when it comes to autocratic 
legitimation. Although there is a common perception that the CCP’s legitimation claim rests 
mostly on performance, it is clear that there are more subtle processes at work. Holbig and 
Gilley (2010, p. 414) find empirical evidence for an ‘unusually agile, responsive, and creative 
party effort to maintain its legitimacy through economic performance, nationalism, ideology, 
culture, governance, and democracy as defined in terms of popular sovereignty under the 
leadership of the party.’ Examples like the inner-party circular known as Document Number 9 
indicate that the CCP perceives many Western ideas as threatening to party rule and thus 
deserving of denigration or censorship (ChinaFile, 2013). More subtly, even if orthodox 
propaganda has lost its ability to inspire many Chinese citizens, its ubiquity in school 
curricula and on TV functions as a signal that the party-state is strong and that resistance to it 
will fail (Huang, 2015). As will be discussed in more detail below, China has also been 
adaptive and flexible in legitimating itself online and in censoring alternative perspectives.  
 Beyond China, subtle processes of autocratic legitimation and manipulation now 
increasingly sit alongside ostensibly democratic institutions. ‘Electoral’ and ‘competitive’ 
authoritarianism are today among the most widespread form of non-democratic rule (Levitsky 
& Way, 2010; Schedler, 2006a). Here democratic institutions are permeated with 
authoritarian praxis and what emerges is authoritarianism with adjectives. In his eminent 
work, Andreas Schedler (2013) has argued that authoritarian rulers face an uncertain 
environment in which they cannot know for sure the security of their grip on power. In this 
situation, many authoritarian rulers admit limited, multiparty competition. Due to external and 
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internal pressure that is moreover catalyzed by globalized information flows that are 
increasingly difficult to control, non-democratic leaders feel compelled to make compromises 
and hold elections.  
 The introduction of multiparty elections, despite being manipulated, gives the 
authoritarian ruler the pretense of democratic legitimacy. This is what we call below the 
‘democratic-procedural’ mechanism of autocratic legitimation. Schedler argues that the step 
to open up multiparty competition is one in which authoritarian regimes ‘establish the 
primacy of democratic legitimation’ (Schedler, 2006b, p. 13). Of course, this is a dangerous 
game and can backfire for the ruling regime because elections can serve as critical junctures 
around which the opposition can mobilize its supporters. Yet, by pledging that democratic 
procedures and norms are followed so that the seemingly true and unfiltered will of the people 
is respected, the authoritarian ruler attempts to create the appearance of a fairly elected leader 
(Morgenbesser, 2016a). The election results demonstrate the popularity and the power of the 
ruling regime. While the ‘menu of manipulation’ (Schedler, 2002) has increased and covers 
all forms of pre- and post-electoral fraud, it has also developed to such an extent that the 
playing field is uneven in very subtle and refined ways that are difficult to detect. As such, 
authoritarian rulers have added an important instrument of creating a legitimacy belief within 
non-democratic rule. Yet, the authoritarian ruler also needs to persuade the citizenry that 
democratic procedures have by and large been respected. One way this can occur is through 
external election observers even if they are sometimes, as Debre and Morgenbesser argue in 
their contribution to this special issue, instruments of manipulation. Regardless, the intended 
message is clear: the authoritarian leader has the support of the people.   
 Even so, authoritarian regimes suffer from informational deficits. The ‘dictator’s 
dilemma’ is always prevalent (Wintrobe, 1998). The ruler does not know the true preferences 
of the ruled because the latter have incentives to hide their true beliefs for fear of repression. 
This is an old dilemma as exemplified by classic stories of the emperor mingling with the 
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common people to learn what they actually think. The dictator’s dilemma has spawned much 
innovative research. For example, it has recently been shown that the Chinese leadership is 
eager to show more responsiveness to the demands of the citizens (Chen, Pan, and Xu, 2016), 
that delegates to the Vietnamese National Assembly are sometimes responsive to their 
constituents (Malesky & Schuler, 2010), and that authoritarian parties which suffer an 
electoral shock sometimes change their policy programs (Miller, 2015).  Officially organized 
venues for citizen deliberation have proliferated in China that provide the government with 
information and with the public appearance of listening to citizen preferences (He & Warren, 
2011).  
 Besides pre-empting protest by gathering information, responsiveness (or the 
appearance of responsiveness) also helps create an image of a legitimate authority that 
respects the will of the people. The innovative work of Martin Dimitrov uncovers one 
forerunner to this kind of responsiveness in communist regimes. By making use of archival 
material, he argues that communist autocracies were eager to collect information on people’s 
opinions in order to detect social problems and track corruption. In explorative studies, he 
finds that (voluntary) citizen complaints were a major information channel in Bulgaria and 
China (Dimitrov 2014; Dimitrov, 2013).  These citizen complaints and their contemporary 
online equivalents provide autocracies with information for the regime to uphold an image of 
a responsive and hence legitimate authority. Besides the rational-legal legitimacy of 
(seemingly) democratic elections, the responsiveness dimension provides a procedural 
component to the legitimacy formula of modern autocracies. 
 A last point that deserves attention and that is the subject of ongoing research is the 
online dimension of autocratic legitimation (e.g. Gunitsky, 2015; Greitens, 2013; Lynch, 
2011). Again, although these dynamics can be found in other autocracies, the global 
trendsetter is China, which has developed a highly elaborate online infrastructure that censors 
only certain types of messages (King, Pan, and Roberts, 2013). The Chinese authorities do 
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allow for oppositional statements so that social media serves as a safety valve for some issues 
in which criticism can be voiced (Hassid, 2012; Yang, 2009). However, the party attempts to 
censor content that might pose a danger of collective action (King, Pan, and Roberts, 2013). 
By so doing, it forestalls offline social mobilization that negatively affects the legitimation 
efforts of the regime. Additionally, the Chinese government has been eager to influence 
online content by creating the ‘fifty-cent army’, so called because of the widespread belief 
that users receive some material benefit for writing positive posts about the Chinese 
government (Han, 2015a). When this praxis came under growing criticism domestically, a 
‘voluntary fifty cent army’ emerged that uses an array of rhetorical tactics to undermine 
critics of the party (Han, 2015b). Ultimately the content of the government’s guided social 
media posts suggests that the aim is to the distract attention of those skeptical of the party 
rather than to directly convince them of the CCP’s merits (King, Pan, and Roberts, 2016).  
 This special issue connects to the studies discussed in this section and can be read not 
only as providing new impetus for the debate, but also as exemplifying the wide range of 
research themes that are subsumed under the legitimation efforts of autocracies. As of now, 
we lack deeper conceptual discussions, more encompassing datasets, and, above all, more 
comparative work to better understand how (and how successfully) autocracies legitimate 
their grip on power. This special issue advances the debate in all three of these areas. Before 
discussing those contributions, we make explicit the four mechanisms of autocratic 
legitimation that have been referenced throughout this introduction and four areas deserving 
of future inquiry.  
 
2.4 A Summary: Proposing Four Mechanisms of Autocratic Legitimation  
 The developments reviewed thus far illustrate that today’s authoritarian regimes have 
considerably increased their legitimation toolbox. To organize inquiry we would posit four 
broad mechanisms for analyzing contemporary autocratic legitimation: the indoctrination 
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mechanism, the passivity mechanism, the performance mechanism, and the democratic-
procedural mechanism. Autocratic regimes differ in the emphasis that they place on these 
mechanisms.  
 First, the old indoctrination of totalitarian regimes in which an exclusive and 
omnipresent political ideology is implanted in the hearts and minds of the ruled might today 
only be detected in lighter shades. The excesses of totalitarianism are mostly phenomena of 
the past. However, it can be useful to keep this mechanism in mind as we observe today’s 
shaded variants of it. There is also no guarantee that such regimes are decisively in history’s 
dustbin. The fact that we still observe fringes that explicitly draw on imagery and rhetoric 
from totalitarian regimes suggests that a rehabilitation of the indoctrination mechanism is at 
least possible.  
 Second, and perhaps more subtle is what we would label the passivity mechanism. 
Here the autocratic ruler is less interested in mobilizing the population than in demobilizing 
potential challengers. The aim is to foster a sense of resignation to the regime’s rule by 
conveying its power, cohesion, and unassailability (Schedler & Hoffmann, 2016). Echoing 
James Scott’s work on institutions of domination, there is great power in a regime making 
itself appear inevitable because it renders overt, declared opposition irrational (Scott, 1990, p. 
220). Passivity is often induced by displays of regime power, but can also take the form of 
distraction, discrediting political alternatives as unrealistic or, in Wedeen’s words, 
disseminating government ideology that ‘clutters public space with monotonous slogans and 
empty gestures, which tire the minds and bodies of producers and consumers alike’ (Wedeen, 
1999, p. 6). The passivity mechanism is difficult to measure because its effect is meant to be 
negative (i.e. forestalling opposition action) but it is reasonable to surmise that passivity for at 
least some portion of the population is a goal for all autocratic regimes.   
 With the rise of socio-economic considerations and promises to fix the country, a third 
legitimation mechanism makes an appearance, namely performance legitimation. Broad 
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segments of the population might accept or even support non-democratic rule if it is perceived 
as performing well (Geddes & Zaller, 1989). As long as the regime is able to deliver, less 
participation is accepted and sacrificed for the sake of order, stability, and growth. While the 
theoretical origins can be traced back to the rentier state debate in the 1970s, we can observe 
an increasing number of autocratic regimes beyond the resource-rich countries that rest their 
legitimation efforts on such a reciprocal social contract between the ruler and the ruled.  
 Fourth and finally, in recent incarnations of authoritarian rule we observe that 
democratic institutions like elections play a larger role in legitimation. Holding semi-
competitive multi-party elections can be instrumentalized to demonstrate – both to a domestic 
and an international audience – that the regime follows the will of the people. Moreover, 
procedural components like deliberative venues or showing responsiveness to citizen’s 
demands might become also more important in the near future.  
 While all of these mechanisms may appear in a given regime, we can observe a time 
trend with regard to their prevalence. While the first mechanism was dominant in totalitarian 
regimes, it is today only observed to a lesser extent while the democratic-procedural and the 
performance-based mechanism have gained in prominence. Furthermore these two 
mechanisms interact with one another, as Cassani’s contribution to this volume discusses.   
 
 
3. Future Avenues   
 This special issue brings together innovative articles that work on the pressing 
questions of how authoritarian rulers make legitimation claims, the extent to which they are 
able to secure a following, and with what effect. Besides using repression and co-optation, 
autocrats need to build a legitimacy basis in order to transform power into longer-lasting and 
more robust rule. What we have learned from the short review of the career of the concept can 
be summarized and extended in the following points. Future research might pick them up and 
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enrich the burgeoning debate. Indeed, the papers that follow begin to pick up on these themes 
in various ways.  
 
1. Legitimacy claim and legitimacy belief 
It is useful to clearly distinguish between what the ruler claims about an entitlement to rule 
and what the population (or different segments of the population) actually believe. Only when 
the claims are met by the respective beliefs can we speak of a legitimate rule. It is not only the 
empirically observable Weberian legitimacy belief of the people that counts, but we can also 
learn from Beetham’s work that rule needs to be justified in the eyes of the people (Beetham, 
1991). This distinction mirrors to some extent the supply and the demand side of the concept 
discussed by von Haldenwang in this special issue. An open question, however, is when and 
how claims to legitimacy matter in the absence of evidence for widespread belief in their 
content. For example, legitimation claims can help repressive agents select particular targets 
for violence even if wide swathes of the population do not believe or are indifferent to those 
claims (Pion-Berlin & Lopez, 1991). Indeed it is even possible to begin from the assumption 
that autocracies approach legitimation strategically such that their leaders may not necessarily 
believe in the regime’s legitimation claims.  
 
 
2. Different sources of legitimacy 
When it comes to the different sources of legitimation, we should not only limit our thinking 
to the grand political ideologies of the past (Burnell, 2006). While some research focuses on 
the broader realm of international dimensions of autocracy and legitimation (e.g. Burnell & 
Schlumberger, 2010; Bader 2015; Tansey 2016), this special issue concerns itself with the 
domestic level where macro ideologies are today less prevalent. International dimensions of 
autocratic legitimation were prevalent during the Cold War as the communist and capitalist 
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blocs attempted to cultivate and bolster client states (see, e.g., Westad, 2007), but today it is 
more difficult to detect a cleavage along grand ideological lines. Instead, we should think of 
multidimensional and eclectic legitimacy formulae in which (amalgams of) nationalist 
sentiments, politicized religion, ethnic divides, historical events, and potential enemies at the 
gates can be used to create smaller-scale ideational frames and narratives that serve the same 
purpose. Indeed, a fruitful strategy may be to focus on the underlying structure and effects of 
legitimation claims rather than their content as such (Dukalskis, 2017).  
 
3. Relationship to Censorship 
Censorship is part of what makes the concept of autocratic legitimation so difficult to analyze. 
The legitimating claims of an autocratic regime are not allowed to compete on an even 
playing field with all ideas. Of course democracies also engage in censorship, but autocracies 
more routinely and systematically censor information perceived to intellectually threaten their 
legitimation claims. Censorship amplifies the legitimation claims of the autocracy and 
marginalizes the voices of regime critics, which renders the question of belief in legitimation 
claims a thorny one. This echoes the discussion above about the extent to which people need 
to be able to freely choose between political ideas in order be said to possess a legitimacy 
belief. The issue can be mitigated by clarifying when legitimacy belief and legitimation 
claims are being analyzed as well as by research designs on the former that carefully take into 
account the role of censorship.   
 
4. Measurement  
 One of the biggest challenges in this research area is still how to measure the concept. 
It is an open challenge to future research even though previous efforts are suggestive of 
fruitful approaches (e.g. Gilley, 2009). When it comes to legitimacy claims measurement 
might be more manageable, although our second point about the nimble and tactical approach 
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that autocracies take toward legitimation means that it is by no means easy. Discourse and 
text analysis offer systematic, valid, and reliable routes to assess the content of official claims. 
Surveys and case narratives that make use of insights in secondary literature can be used 
(Grauvogel & von Soest, 2014; Kailitz, 2013). In this special issue von Soest and Grauvogel 
present an innovative expert survey to systematically assess the legitimacy claims of 
contemporary autocracies.   
 The bigger challenge lies in finding out what people actually believe. Preference 
falsification plagues all kinds of survey research, but is even more embedded when 
researching non-democratic environments (Kuran, 1997). Behavioral indicators like protest 
behavior and migration patterns – or ‘voice’ and ‘exit’ (Hirschman, 1970) – might be another 
route but are often confounded as they might be driven by other variables. While constituting 
a challenge, there exist innovative attempts to circumvent this problem (e.g. Gilley, 2009; 
Kern & Hainmeuller, 2009; Haggard & Noland, 2011; Dimitrov, 2014). Sometimes it is 
fortuitous timing that matters such as a window of opportunity in which new research options 
become possible. Thyen and Gerschewski could, for example, rely on a survey that was taken 
in the brief phase of political liberalization in Morocco and Egypt after the Arab Spring 
protests (Thyen & Gerschewski, in preparation). In this light, we should be eager to embrace a 
variety of approaches such as natural experiments (e.g. Kern & Hainmeuller, 2009), use of 
archival documents (e.g. Dimitrov, 2014), online participatory observation (e.g. Han, 2015a; 
Han 2015b), surveys (e.g. Mazepus, this issue; Kennedy, 2009; Geddes & Zaller, 1989), semi-
structured interviews (e.g. Dukalskis, 2017), and quantitative text mining (e.g. King, Pan, and 
Roberts, 2013). The arsenal of social science methods is broad and making use of the full 
spectrum to study autocratic legitimation will yield new insights. 
 
  
4. The Contributions 
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 The following five articles in this special issue make excellent progress in advancing 
our understanding of autocratic legitimation.  They each address a different portion of the 
conceptual terrain discussed throughout this introductory essay.  This final section will briefly 
introduce the central themes addressed in the contributions to this special issue.  
 Conceptualizing legitimacy and legitimation in precise terms is a key task of work in 
this area.  This introductory essay has attempted to contribute in this regard, but Christian von 
Haldenwang’s article goes further and deeper. It is an important contribution that not only 
identifies shortcomings in research on legitimation but also proposes a novel framework for 
analysis. It is a useful counterpoint to arguments that social scientists should jettison the 
concept of legitimacy (e.g. Marquez, 2016). He identifies two cycles of legitimation that 
correspond to the ‘supply’ provided by political elites and the ‘demand’ generated from 
society. From this heuristic von Haldenwang provides an assessment of the possibilities and 
constraints of measuring and analyzing each dimension of legitimacy. The result is a rigorous 
but flexible framework that will be of use to researchers approaching questions of autocratic 
legitimation.  
 Picking up explicitly on the first avenue for future research identified above, namely 
the legitimacy claim versus legitimacy belief distinction, the contribution by Christian von 
Soest and Julia Grauvogel empirically maps the claims of contemporary autocracies. They 
focus explicitly on legitimation claims instead of legitimation beliefs, or as they put it 
‘legitimation as the strategy to seek legitimacy rather than legitimacy itself.’ In an innovative 
advance on previous research, the authors have conducted an expert survey to create a 
typology of autocratic legitimation strategies. Their preliminary analysis reveals typological 
patterns that are useful for researchers, such as that closed authoritarian regimes rely 
disproportionately on identity-based claims while competitive regimes more often deploy 
procedural legitimation claims. This research will be useful for scholars attempting cross-
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national comparisons as well as those interested in locating their case in a larger universe of 
autocratic legitimation.  
 One can also reverse the optics by examining not claims by elites, but beliefs of the 
population. This requires progress on the fourth point for future research identified above, 
namely careful measurement. Honorata Mazepus crosses the regime-type divide by presenting 
research that compares ideas about legitimacy in both democratic and non-democratic 
regimes. Drawing on over 1,000 respondents in five countries – Ukraine, Russia, Poland, 
France, and the Netherlands – she is able to challenge the idea that citizens in democracies 
and non-democracies think radically differently from one another about what makes political 
rule legitimate. Some surprises emerge that will be of interest to scholars, such as the Russian 
sample ranking elections as a highly important element of legitimacy or the French 
respondents largely disregarding honesty and fairness in their assessments. But the main 
message is perhaps even more important and suggests that the legitimacy beliefs of 
democratic and non-democratic citizens are perhaps not as alien to one another as one might 
assume. This has implications for the four mechanisms outlined above insofar as procedure 
may be responsive to legitimacy beliefs while the importance of fostering passivity increases 
if there is not a match between citizen belief and regime claims.  
 Even so, the procedural-democratic mechanism relies to some extent on external 
validation. Skeptics may be unwilling to believe that autocracies run clean elections and so 
election observation is one tool of validating the procedural-democratic mechanism of 
legitimation. Maria Debre and Lee Morgenbesser train their focus on an unusual empirical 
phenomenon – shadow election observers, or SOGs – and unwind its theoretical relevance for 
the study of legitimation in autocracies. SOGs are façade organizations that presumably will 
authenticate an election for a price or a return favor. They function to validate autocratic 
elections and cast doubt on the assessments of more reputable professionalized election 
observer groups.  The presence of SOGs, as the authors demonstrate in the cases of 
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Cambodia, Zimbabwe, and Egypt, allows autocracies to simulate compliance with election 
standards so that they may manufacture procedural legitimacy.   
 Similarly, claims to performance legitimation may also require some degree of 
correspondence with objective realities. It is therefore useful to understand patterns of certain 
policy outcomes within autocracies. Focusing on social service provision, Andrea Cassani’s 
contribution to this issue provides a rigorous test of the performance of different regime types 
in their quest to secure performance legitimation. Comparing military and one-party regimes 
on the one hand with electoral autocracies on the other, Cassani finds that electoral 
autocracies deliver better results in terms of education and health care. Hereditary monarchies 
perform on a similar level as electoral autocracies in these two areas. The actual ability to 
perform is a key dimension of performance legitimacy and the article adroitly explains the 
importance of these results. Scholars interested in the performance of different types of 
autocratic regimes and the ways in which they leverage success in delivering public goods to 
legitimate their rule will find this article to be a rich contribution.   
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i
 We would like to highlight that we focus in this article on four mechanisms on how autocracies legitimate their 
rule. This should not be confused with the approach of Christian von Haldenwang (in this issue) who refers to 
four different ways of operationalization and concrete measurement.  
